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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Michael Comstock 
 
PRESIDENCY  
Voloshin: close to the edge  
One of the key players within the executive branch representing the Yel'tsin 
group, Alexander Voloshin, soon may be vacating his post as head of the 
Presidential Administration. The ubiquitous Russian President Vladimir Putin thus 
far has maintained a carefully constructed balance of political power between the 
holdovers of the Yel'tsin group and the St. Petersburgers (so known by their 
connections to the city and to Putin himself). Voloshin, along with Prime Minister 
Mikhail Kasyanov, represent the most influential internal counters to a nearly 
complete control of the Russian government by Putin and his men.  
 
Two recent developments have brought to light this possible shake-up inside 
Russia. According to Russian papers, there is some support for Valery Golubev 
as a potential replacement for Voloshin. Golubev's chief qualifications, other than 
his status as a resident of St. Petersburg and a stint as representative of the 
Leningrad Region within the Russian Federation Council, include reportedly 
knowing and working with Vladimir Putin in foreign intelligence (KGB) during the 
Soviet period, and then in the city's administration following the collapse of the 
USSR. His promotion might be "balanced" by the resignation of another St. 
Petersburger, Sergey Mironov, the Federation Council chairman, and his 
replacement by a member of the Yel'tsin "family." (CENTRE TV, 1600 GMT, 7 
Sep 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database)  
 
Taken alone, such speculation could be dismissed as the usual sensationalistic 
reportage currently popular within Russia, but other events elevate it above this 
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status. The recent narrow victory by Putin's supporters within the Duma to pass 
an amendment to Russian constitutional law is a case in point. Putin's supporters 
succeeded in prohibiting a national referendum in years preceding presidential or 
parliamentary elections. The event carries implication concerning the fragility of 
the balance of power between the Yel'tsin group and Putin's Petersburgers. Had 
the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) succeeded in defeating 
this amendment, Putin would have faced a difficult choice. Many expected that 
the KPRF would have forced Putin to decide between some very destabilizing 
national referenda concerning land reform, wages, tariffs and nationalization of 
resources and the equally unsavory option of buying off the KPRF with 
government positions that carry substantive powers. This would have led 
inevitably to the diminution of the Yel'tsin group and perhaps the end of 
Voloshin's political career. Although Voloshin seems to have averted for the 
present being sidelined, his position does seem to be quite precarious. No love is 
likely to be lost in the near future between the KPRF and Voloshin, and indeed, 
Putin himself. If the KPRF is willing to challenge the president's power structure 
so openly, then it must expect a counterstrike from the executive branch. 
(KOMMERSANT, 19 Sep 02, and IZVESTIA PRESS DIGEST, 19 Sep 02; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database)  
 
Survey on autocracy  
A recent survey concerning implementation of President Putin's executive orders 
shows that approximately 62% remain unfulfilled. The results cannot be judged 
as a true indicator of Putin's autocratic governing style because the statistics 
probably represent only the level of bureaucratic incompetence. As stated by the 
head of the Expert Institute with the Union of Russian Industrialists and 
Entrepreneurs, Andrei Neshchadin, "They (government bureaucrats) often don't 
understand the problems that they are called to resolve and are unable to 
formulate clearly the task of proper implementation." This statement does not 
even account for pure corruption and malfeasance. Indeed, the survey that was 
not conducted, and should have been, would have addressed how many of 
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Putin's decrees, orders and whims have been actively sabotaged, not merely 
unfulfilled. (THE ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 20 Sep 02; via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Michael Donahue 
 
Fighting terrorism at home and abroad 
On the heels of US President George W. Bush's address to the UN General 
Assembly, in which he reiterated the position that the US might use military force 
to destroy threats preemptively with or without the support of the international 
bureaucracy, Russian President Vladimir Putin and FSB chief Nikolai Patrushev 
used a false analogy to threaten military action in Russia's "war on terrorism" 
against Georgia.  
 
Russia has long alleged that Georgia is turning a blind eye to "terrorists" 
supposedly hiding in the Pankisi Gorge. Recently, however, Russian officials 
have intimated that Tbilisi is not just incapable of doing something about the 
"terrorists" it claims are hiding in the gorge, but also unwilling. While Georgian 
officials have long insisted that they are indeed attempting to flush out any 
Chechen fighters, having gone so far as to enlist the assistance of American 
special forces (Green Berets) to train and equip Georgia's military in 
counterterror operations, last week President Putin alleged that the Georgian 
leadership was cooperating with Chechen guerrillas and al-Qaeda terrorists in 
the gorge. (AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE, 19 Sep 02; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) Georgia's stand has been supported by international observers who 
have visited the area. 
 
While Putin and Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze's war of words 
continued throughout the week, Russia reportedly moved numerous attack 
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planes and bombers to its main North Caucasus base (Mozdok) and intimated 
that it might take matters completely in its own hands. Russia's lower house of 
parliament has drafted a document confirming Moscow's right to "self-defense" 
and endorsed military strikes. (AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE, 19 Sep 02; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) President Bush has voiced his support for 
President Shevardnadze and warned Russia not to conduct military operations in 
Georgia, with what effect remains to be seen. 
 
The former head of Georgian special services, and current (exiled) head of 
Georgia's political opposition, Igor Giorgadze, who has been implicated in 
attempts on Shevardnadze's life, endorsed the Russian accusations against 
Georgia from Moscow. He claimed that, if the Georgian security ministry were 
truly cooperating with the FSB, there would be no Pankisi problem, and that 
Georgian officials provided Chechen refugees with an opportunity to relocate to a 
safer location. (IZVESTIA, 6 Sep 02; What The Papers Say, via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) However, one must consider that Giorgadze is 
Shevardnadze's sworn enemy and currently resides in Russia (thanks to 
Moscow's refusal of Georgia's requests for his extradition). His allegations must 
be taken with a grain of salt, but, of course, provide Moscow officials with a 
supposedly "Georgian" endorsement of their claims.  
 
In other news, the FSB has announced that Russian scientists are now targets 
for kidnapping and torture by terrorists seeking nuclear technologies. The 
reference was to the former chairman of the Department of Physical Chemistry at 
Krasnoyarsk State University, Professor Sergei Bakhvalov, who was abducted on 
18 August and found dead 10 days later. Forensic experts reported that his body 
showed signs of extensive torture -- perhaps in an attempt to gain nuclear 
technology information from him, the FSB claimed. (ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, 20 
Sep 02; What The Papers Say, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Russian 
security services claim that Krasnoyarsk is replete with dual-use technologies 
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and that terrorist groups seeking nuclear, or near-nuclear, material could obtain 
it, if not by bribery then through intimidation, extortion and torture.  
 
In a seemingly unrelated story, the FSB detained three men, also in Krasnoyarsk, 
for trying to sell more than six pounds of stolen gold. With this particular seizure, 
law enforcement officials report that more than 11 pounds of gold and silver 
(each) have been confiscated in the region alone.  
 
It seems that any terrorist groups involved in these activities are taking needless 
risks. After all, Moscow is openly providing Islamic fundamentalist regimes, such 
as Iran, with nuclear technology, and these regimes have long supported 
international terrorists. Wouldn't it be more practical simply to wait for Moscow's 
new nuclear partners to hand over the finished product rather than to try and 
steal the technology and expertise piecemeal? 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Charity begins at home 
On 11 September 2002, Russian anti-American sentiments surfaced. Many 
apparently resented the large amount of media time and space dedicated to the 
coverage of the tragedy in the US. Many griped that the coverage took attention 
away from Russia's own victims of terrorism -- over 300 persons who died in 
explosions (including two in Moscow on 8 and 13 September 1999, and one in 
Volgodonsk on 16 September). 
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State Duma deputies made a point of holding a moment of silence not for the 
victims of the terrorist attacks in America, but rather for "all who had died over the 
past summer" -- the victims of the flooding in southern Russia and of the 
automobile accident on 9 September 2002. (ORT, 9 and 11 Sep 02; via 
www.ortv.ru) 
 
Sentiments in the parliament also were fueled by the discussions of opposition to 
the possible US military action against Iraq. The first deputy speaker of the 
Russian State Duma, Lyubov Sliska, told the lower house of parliament that she 
had received "special information" from the working group Duma-Congress that 
the American administration was leaning more and more toward the use of force 
against Baghdad. She noted that she is "against military actions in any country," 
[but not Chechnya?] and stressed that "information about terrorist number one 
Osama bin Laden reportedly hiding in Iraq does not give Americans the right to 
declare that state a rogue one." (ITAR-TASS, 1037 GMT, 9 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-
2002-0909, via World News Connection) 
 
The Unity faction leader in the State Duma, Vladimir Pekhtin, suggested that the 
"September 11 attacks shattered the United States' illusions about its security," 
but "a military operation against Iraq won't restore that protection." He said that, a 
year after the tragedy, "it has become evident that not everyone has learned its 
lessons equally well," and that the United States is pursuing "a risky policy of 
unilateral steps in relation to Iraq." (INTERFAX, 0902 GMT, 11 Sep 02; FBIS-
SOV-2002-0911, via World News Connection) 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
... Or in front of someone else's home 
The National Bolsheviks went a few steps farther, of course. About 30 party 
members held a demonstration in front of the American ambassador's residence 
"in memory of the suicide pilots of the hijacked planes," to express their 
"solidarity with the 'rogue' countries" and advocate the formation of a coalition of 
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'rogue' states." The demonstrators flaunted red banners and posters reading "US 
- Enemy of Democracy!" and chanted phrases such as "Iraq Today, Russia 
Tomorrow!" and "New York Must be Ruined!". (INTERFAX, 1040 GMT, 11 Sep 
02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0911, via World News Connection) 
 
Certainly these individuals can be dismissed as extremists. But similar attitudes 
are already rooted in the minds of the next generation. According to the interior 
ministry, "some 10,000 Russians, mostly young people, are members of neo-
Nazi groups." Skinheads and other "soccer fans," as they prefer to call 
themselves, regularly attack students, diplomats and traders from African and 
Asian countries, as well as from the Caucasus region, in Moscow, St. 
Petersburg, and other Russian cities. The latest atrocity took place in St. 
Petersburg, where a 53-year-old Azerbaijani watermelon salesman was beaten 
to death by 30 skinheads. The police even seized a videotape made by the 
skinheads, and identified some who have been involved in previous racist 
attacks. (INTERFAX, 16 Sep 02; What the Papers Say, via lexis-nexis) But the 
police officers often sympathize with the youths, and little is done to punish or 
prevent future attacks. 
 
President Putin's appeals to the prosecutor's office to "make active use of the 
mechanism of the law" under the recently passed law on fighting extremism, 
seems to fall on deaf ears -- or else the mechanism of the law itself cannot stand 
up to the metal bars used by the neo-Nazis. (ITAR-TASS, 1455 GMT, 17 Sep 02; 
FBIS-SOV-2002-0917, via World News Connection) 
 
To that end, a concept for a new state youth policy was unveiled on 11 
September. The main principle of the concept is that the "young people do not 
fully understand the kind of world they live in" and need Putin to help them. 
Based on the model of the Communist Youth League (Komsomol), the new 
concept seeks to involve these youths as "an active force in society and a 
strategic resource for the state under the auspices of the president," and calls for 
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the establishment of a special presidential youth affairs council. (INTERFAX, 12 
Sep 02; What the Papers Say, via lexis-nexis) 
 
And yet, according to Novaya gazeta, some of these extremists are already 
getting orders from above. Aleksei Mitriushin, the head of the Moscow office of 
the strongly pro-Putin youth organization Moving Together, is also the head of 
the Beshnnye Zherebtsy (Crazy Stallions), one of the best organized skinhead 
groups. The members, too, overlap, according to Novaya gazeta -- half of the 50 
Mad Stallions also belong to the Moving Together youth group. Reportedly they 
are well-funded, and given orders -- to sabotage an anti-globalist meeting, to get 
the point across to migrant workers, or to make life difficult for modern writers 
whose topics and language goes against their "morals." (NOVAYA GAZETA; 23 
Sep 02; via www.novayagazeta.ru) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Ansel Stein 
 
Coalition building 
Capitalizing on the dissent emanating from many non-Western and some 
Western countries following the apparent likelihood of US military action against 
Iraq, Moscow has built its own international coalition of sorts. Russia has been 
able to call upon its Cold War-era relationships, and some newer allies, to 
coordinate opposition to American strategy in the Middle East. Arab reluctance to 
support American action has provided Russia with the opportunity to 
demonstrate its solidarity with the Arab world. In the days following President 
Bush's speech to the United Nations General Assembly, Russian Foreign 
Minister Igor Ivanov met with the foreign ministers of the Arab states that were 
aligned with the Soviet Union: Libya, Syria, Egypt and, of course, Iraq. In addition 
he met with Amr Mousa, General Secretary of the Arab League (an outspoken 
critic of American Middle East policy), the foreign ministers of Jordan and Kuwait, 
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and representatives from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC -- members include 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE and Oman). Each of these meetings 
produced a predictable call for a "diplomatic" settlement to the dispute between 
Iraq and the US.  
 
On 13 September, US Undersecretary of State John Bolton, who was in Moscow 
to prepare for the first session of the Russian-American Consultation Group on 
Strategic Security (which took place on 20 September in Washington) shed light 
upon one of Russia's motives for taking this position. At his final news 
conference, Bolton responded to a question about Iraq by stating that "there will 
be no exchange of concessions with either Russia or other countries concerning 
the US stance on Iraq." (INTERFAX, 13 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0913, via 
World News Connection) Russia apparently had intimated that it might soften it 
opposition to American action in the Gulf in return for a free hand to "deal" with 
Georgia. 
 
Another motivating factor for Russia is securing the $40 billion "program for 
economic cooperation" between itself and Iraq. In effect, Iraq will reward Russia 
for its diplomatic support if everything goes Iraq's way. Moscow announced this 
week that it expects Iraq's compliance with UN resolutions will pave the way for 
signing the program. (INTERFAX, 14 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0914, via World 
News Connection) This would explain Russia's insistence on the quick 
deployment of UN inspectors. Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov announced that 
the first (43-member) group of UN inspectors would depart for Iraq as early as 
this week. Ivanov continued, "personally, I believe that one month will be enough 
for the inspectors to determine whether production of weapons of mass 
destruction exists in Iraq or not." (ITAR-TASS, 0633 GMT, 19 Sep 02; FBIS-
SOV-2002-0919, via World News Connection) There is general consensus 
among the former inspectors that attempting to ferret out in a month what 
previous inspectors failed to detect in years is absurd. A speedy, less-than-
thorough inspection would guarantee essentially that the UN inspectors would 
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not find any of Iraq's well-hidden weapons. Russia's ideal scenario reads 
something like this: Failing to find the weapons they are looking for, the UN 
inspectors depart. The sanctions regime is then ended (the Security Counsel 
resolution will be sponsored by Russia). This clears the way for the signing of the 
economic arrangement and Russian domination of the Iraqi economy. This in 
turn extends Russia's nouveau empire into the Middle East, along lines similar to 
its recent reestablishment in Armenia. What is more, America suffers a strategic 
defeat. 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Steve Kwast and Dan Rozelle 
 
The more things change, the more they stay the same 
Moscow has officially started its journey to transform the armed forces. On 1 
September, the experiment to transfer Russia's 76th Airborne Division to an all-
contract service began. It constitutes a test case to see how much it will cost, and 
what hidden difficulties will be encountered, to transform the entire Russian 
military. Many smaller changes have taken place since the start of military 
reform. Line troops and various entities have been downsized, reorganized and 
renamed. Substantial money has been devoted to this cause, but it seems that 
all these supposed changes have achieved very little. There has been no overall 
improvement in the armed forces of the Russian Federation, while problems of 
military discipline have intensified from year to year. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 
3 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0903, via World News Connection) Additionally, the 
events of the past few weeks highlight the fact that Moscow's goal of 
transforming the military may be good in theory, but very far from a reality. 
 
President Putin and Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov both have a reasonable 
vision of what a vital and relevant military should be in the 21st century. They see 
military transformation as one of organization, training and culture, and 
understand that building up the respect and dignity of the military culture must be 
the first step. That is why they are spending in excess of 2.7 billion rubles on the 
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76th Airborne Division alone. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 16 Aug 02; FBIS-SOV-
2002-0816, via World News Connection) According to Colonel General Georgy 
Shpak, commander of airborne forces, construction has been aggressive since 
July to build new divisional housing developments, schools, a kindergarten, 
stores and a clubhouse. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 3 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-
0903, via World News Connection) These are the types of facilities that provide a 
sense of dignity and pride to persons serving their country. This is not cheap, 
however, and Moscow understands this. Last month the Russian defense 
ministry reported that spending in 2003 will increase 45.9% from this year. Of the 
additional 77 billion rubles to be spent next year, R47 billion are assigned for 
social spending (R27 billion on pensions, and R20 billion on increasing 
allowances for regular officers). (INTERFAX, 1630 GMT, 15 Aug 02; FBIS-SOV-
2002-0815, via World News Connection) 
 
Money spent on quality-of-life infrastructure is useless, however, if the troops, 
and the military industrial complex, are not organized, trained and equipped to 
accomplish the mission. Putin seems to understand this point. In a recent visit to 
the Far East, he visited facilities and spoke of instilling a semblance of order to 
both the military and industry (his three themes: discipline, increasing salaries, 
and promoting the military as a proud "state institution"). It was no accident that 
Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov was by Putin's side without Chief of General 
Staff Anatoly Kvashnin: The rivalry between Kvashnin and Ivanov could have 
overshadowed the president's message. (VREMYA, 29 Aug 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-
0829, via World News Connection) 
 
In addition to funding infrastructure and delivering policy speeches to the troops, 
Putin and Ivanov are rightly targeting training as a pivotal issue in the military's 
transformation. "It is impossible to accomplish this task without increasing the 
proportion of combat training," Ivanov said during his tour with Putin. (ITAR-
TASS, 1210 GMT, 26 Aug 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0826, via World News 
Connection) In another speech, Ivanov stated, "I personally am very glad that our 
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armed forces are gradually going back to normal and do what they should be 
doing -- combat training." (ITAR-TASS, 1428 GMT, 24 Aug 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-
0824, via World News Connection) Moscow is showing a united front as it targets 
training and troop readiness. On 9 September, Kvashnin inspected the United 
Army Group units in the North Caucasus, checking the combat training and 
readiness of the units of the 42nd Motorized Division (deployed in Chechnya) 
and the 58th Army on the Russian-Georgian border. (ITAR-TASS, 1939 GMT, 9 
Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0909, via World News Connection) The same types of 
inspection are taking place simultaneously throughout Russia. President Putin's 
special envoy, Dmitry Rogozin, recently visited the Kaliningrad region to analyze 
the state of the Baltic Fleet. (ITAR-TASS, 2143 GMT, 12 Aug 02; FBIS-SOV-
2002-0812, via World News Connection) 
 
Despite such strategies, however, events in the last few weeks reflect the reality 
that nothing really changes in Russia. In the Volgograd region, 54 Russian 
soldiers deserted their post: Five had accused the division chief of staff, Maj. 
Shiryaev, of beating them, while the other 49 soldiers joined the deserters in a 
show of solidarity. (INTERFAX, 0953 GMT, 11 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0911, 
via World News Connection) Desertions are routine in Russia's demoralized and 
under-funded 1.2 million-man army. A report in the weekly defense review of the 
Moscow newspaper Nezavisimaya gazeta in July quoted the defense ministry as 
saying that 2,270 servicemen deserted in the first half of this year. (THE 
WASHINGTON POST, 11 Sep 02) This type of desertion rate reflects a brutal 
army culture. 
 
In addition, corruption and low morale still haunt the services at all levels. Just 
last month, Lieutenant Colonel I. Rachkov, a department chief at Tula's 
Proletarsky Rayon Military Commissariat, was caught red-handed receiving a 
bribe. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 20 Aug 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0820, via World 
News Connection) Experience shows that for each case reported, hundreds go 
unreported. The fact that Moscow only goes after "small fish," such as Lt. Col. 
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Rachkov, illustrates part of the dilemma. If the reformers went after the top ranks, 
the whole organization would collapses because it is a system that relies on 
some corruption to run. Rachkov represents an example Moscow can point out to 
show how serious it is about cracking down on corruption. 
 
Morale is critically low, too. In Chechnya, officers are grumbling that Moscow is 
depriving them of numerous benefits. This is causing significant dissatisfaction in 
the ranks. Many are not happy with the course of the reforms, and discipline 
among the troops is disgracefully weak. There is no new equipment and there 
are no replacements on the horizon. Troops look at Putin's initiative to increase 
monetary allowances by 11-percent in January 2003 as a joke. With a 12-percent 
annual inflation rate, they are still going backward. (VREMYA, 29 Aug 02; FBIS-
SOV-2002-0829, via World News Connection) 
 
However, the bad news is not limited to the "usual suspects." Recently, word 
came that 20, 000 former Soviet officers, who settled in Kaliningrad Region after 
the pullout from the Baltic states, can't obtain Russian citizenship. The new 
Russian law on citizenship does not recognize the validity of identification papers 
issued by military authorities. (MAYAK RADIO, 1100 GMT, 2 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-
202-0902, via World News Connection) This falls into the category of "actions 
speak louder than words." The military rank and file looks at this apparent lack of 
respect for retired soldiers as an indicator of how they are valued by the country's 
leaders. To add insult to injury, Moscow announced that it would re-institute the 
system of "political officers" assigned to each major military unit. This puts the 
Russian military back 60 years to the days when Stalin used Political 
Commissars to control and coerce the military. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 9 Sep 02) 
These recent events breed fear, mistrust and disdain among the men and 
women in uniform, illustrating that the more things change, the more they don't. 
They are also inconsistent with any attempt by Moscow to update its military. 
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If Putin really wants to reform the military, he needs to start by changing Russian 
social norms of behavior. As long as corruption is accepted in society, there will 
be corruption in the military. As long as brutality is accepted in society, it will exist 
in the military too. And if Putin wants to return dignity and respect to the military, 
he has to establish policies that show that respect. He has to pay troops an 
honest wage, keep faith with promised retirements and provide the requisite 
equipment, facilities and training. Additionally, Putin needs to make some hard 
decisions about what units and facilities to cut. If he extrapolates the 2.7 billion 
rubles spent on the 76th Airborne Division to his whole military, he will go broke 
before he is halfway along any type of transformation. 
 
The symbolic kickoff of Russia's military transformation may have taken place 
with the 76th Airborne Division test, but the grim reality of an oversized Russian 
military has not changed. Putin must attack the root causes of these problems 
and build trust with the military or he will break the Russian bank trying to 
transform a military that will be incapable of change. 
 
Into the arms of NATO  
Russia continues to do itself no favors with regard to NATO expansion. The 
continued threats by Russia to conduct military action in pursuit of alleged 
Chechen rebels in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge have yielded a not-unexpected 
result. (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 11 Sep 02) The growing tensions in Russo-
Georgian relations are "pushing Georgia into joining NATO, which could provide 
for its security," according to Irakly Batiashvili, chairman of Georgia's 
parliamentary committee on defense and national security. In fact, on 13 
September, the Georgian parliament passed a resolution authorizing the process 
to join NATO. (INTERFAX 1319 GMT, 14 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0914, via 
World News Connection) While Georgia's interest in joining the alliance it not 
new, recent Russian aggression has caused Tbilisi to crank up the volume. 
President Shevardnadze has said that Georgia would announce its desire to join 
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NATO at the upcoming NATO summit in Prague. (INTERFAX, 1630 GMT, 16 
Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0916, via World News Connection) 
 
Russian criticism of the announcement was almost immediate. Colonel General 
Yuri Baluevsky, first deputy chief of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff, 
denied plans to invade Georgia but stated that Russia is prepared to "offer 
assistance" in neutralizing the "terrorist bases" in the Pankisi Gorge. And, on 
Georgia's desire to join NATO, he felt that "the Georgian military is unlikely to be 
able to meet NATO military and technological requirements... but the political 
element will be given priority while reviewing Georgia's application...." (RFE/RL 
NEWSLINE, 17 Sep 02) 
 
Russian Navy update: Out with the old... 
Russia continues to struggle with the decommissioning of its nuclear submarine 
fleet. The country's difficulties were openly admitted at the recent Ekoflot 2002 
international conference on nuclear security in Vladivostok. The conference, held 
by the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy (Minatom), included participants from 
the Russian defense ministry, the Russian Academy of Science and specialists 
from a number of countries including the United States, Britain and Japan. (ITAR-
TASS, 1058 GMT, 16 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0916, via World News 
Connection)  
 
Russia's aging fleet of navy ships and tons of spent nuclear fuel constitute a 
significant ecological and nuclear security issue. The concern was clearly evident 
in the warning made at the conference by Viktor Akhunov, head of Minatom's 
department of ecology and decommissioning. Speaking on the condition of ships 
along it eastern and arctic coasts, he stated that only 71 of 190 decommissioned 
submarines have had their fuel removed and that two reactors already have 
leaked. This leaves the remaining vessels docked and corroding, and in danger 
of sinking (two already did in 1997 and 1999). At present, Russia has allocated 
$70 million toward improving nuclear security by decommissioning and scrapping 
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its nuclear submarines. However, Mr. Akhunov estimated that nearly $4 billion 
would be needed to achieve the scrapping of 131 submarines by 2010. (THE 
GUARDIAN, 18 Sep 02; via lexis-nexis)  
 
This cost estimate coincides with a meeting between US Energy Secretary 
Spencer Abraham and his Russian counterpart. The Russians clearly hope to 
convince the United States to foot this particular bill. In fact, the United States 
has provided almost $5 billion in the last 10 years toward nuclear disarmament 
under the Joint Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) Program and has promised 
another $10 billion at the most recent G-8 summit. (VREMYA NOVOSTEI, 30 
Aug 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security Database) However, 
the Russian claim (and possible ploy for more money) is that US financing is 
directed more towards decommissioning the modern and militarily dangerous 
submarines and less toward older vessels.  
 
The decommissioning and eventual scrapping of the submarines is only part of a 
potentially much larger problem. Lacking adequate facilities (and perhaps 
capabilities), the Russians have been storing the spent nuclear fuel from the 
submarines on an aging fleet of tankers that is well beyond its useful life span. 
This fact, coupled with the admission that security around the nuclear material is 
all but absent, raises even more questions about an already suspect Russian 
nuclear program. (THE GUARDIAN, 18 Sep 02; via lexis-nexis) 
 
... In with the new 
Has the Russian Navy finally overcome the Kursk tragedy? President Putin 
would like the Navy to believe so. In remarks last month during a visit to the 
Pacific Fleet, he admitted that the Navy's share of Russia's defense budget has 
been too small and indicated that an increase will be considered. Of keen 
importance to the Navy, of course, is construction of new ships. (NEZAVISIMOE 
VOENNOE OBOZRENIYE, 6 Sep 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and 
Security Database)  
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According to Navy Commander Vladimir Kuroedov, the Russian Navy will have 
no more than 60 ships by 2015 if current funding levels do not improve. This is in 
contrast to the Navy's desires to have 12-15 strategic, 50 nuclear and 35 diesel 
submarines along with 50 surface combatants. This may be difficult to achieve. 
Current funding levels for the Navy are at 11-12% of total defense spending, 
which covers only about 5% of the total shipbuilding costs. (MOSKOVSKY 
KOMSOMOLETS, 29 Aug 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and 
Security Database)  
 
Even with forecast increases in the Navy's funding by up to 80%, the branch will 
be hardpressed to complete 4-5 submarines and 3-4 surface ships each year 
needed to meet this goal, especially when one considers, as Commander 
Kuroedov says, that the Navy must have 25% of the real cost for the construction 
of the new ships. (NEZAVISIMOE VOENNOE OBOZRENIYE, 6 Sep 02; What 
the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security Database) At present ship 
construction is being financed at only 3-5% of actual costs. This makes 
construction almost pointless since the ships will be outdated by the time they 
are completed. In the end it will be up to President Putin to deliver on his 
promises. Given the economic realities, it will be difficult. 
 
Coincidence? 
A joint Russian and NATO exercise called "Bogorodsk 2002 scenario" will be 
held this month outside of Moscow. The exercise, as described by a NATO 
official, will include a terrorist act that occurs at a chemical facility. (ITAR-TASS, 
16 Sep 02; via lexis-nexis) Approximately 850 individuals from over 30 countries 
will participate in activities including deployment, evacuations, victim recovery 
and air reconnaissance. The key goal of the exercise is to test the preparedness 
of Russia's emergencies ministry and of NATO's Civil Emergency Planning 
Directorate for the announced terrorist scenario. (ITAR-TASS, 0736 GMT, 16 
Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0916, via World News Connection) 
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The Presidential Administration's Control Department recently announced that 
Russia is four years behind the internationally approved schedule for destroying 
chemical weapons. Designed to destroy 400 tons of chemical weapons by 2000 
and 8,000 tons by 2002, the program so far has done little more than pay the 
salaries of Russian ammunition agency officials. Funding over the last five years 
has amounted only to 4.7% of that initially planned. (IZVESTIA, 18 Sep 02; via 
lexis nexis) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Nadja Kinsky 
 
UKRAINE 
Yushchenko - a cog in the opposition's machine, or a spanner in the 
works? 
While clear lines are being drawn in Ukraine between opposition and pro-
presidential forces, there still is one person apparently undecided as to which 
side he's going to take -- and he just happens to be a key player, former Prime 
Minister Victor Yushchenko.  
 
Three opposition groups -- the Yulya Tymoshenko Bloc, the Socialist Party and 
the Communist Party -- called for protests against President Leonid Kuchma to 
be held on the second anniversary of the disappearance of journalist Georgiy 
Gongadze on 16 September. While not completely rejecting participation in this 
protest action, Yushchenko nevertheless kept himself aloof, organizing a forum 
"For the Democratic Development of Ukraine" on 15 September at which he 
proposed a five-step plan to solve the "deepest political crisis in which Ukraine 
has been since independence." The first of these five steps, forming a 
parliamentary majority, was initiated the same day, when a declaration on 
forming a parliamentary majority was signed by Yushchenko and the leaders of 
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four government parties (The Entrepreneurs-Working Ukraine, Democratic 
Initiatives, Popular Democratic Party and Agricultural Ukraine). Yushchenko 
explained that the problem with Ukraine's government was systemic and warned 
that "overly personifying Ukraine's problems" would constitute an easy but 
inefficient solution. (RADIO KONTINENT, 18 Sep 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) To be sure, Yushchenko's stated desire to "find a 
democratic solution" is an admirable goal, however, at the same time he may be 
undermining the progress of the opposition through his indecision. The next four 
steps -- forming a coalition cabinet, signing a trilateral accord between president, 
parliament and government on joint actions, abolishing censorship and 
establishing a dialogue between the authorities and society -- still seem a way 
off.  
 
The issues of censorship and obstruction of opposition parties came to the fore 
again during the runup to the 16 September protests. In Kyiv, the protests were 
actually outlawed in advance by decree, in Kharkov an entertainment stage was 
erected to block the square in which the protests were to take place, and, on her 
way to the protests, Yulya Tymoshenko found her plane being stopped from 
takeoff for dubious reasons. Media coverage before, during and after the protests 
was heavily criticized by the opposition, as was to be expected. The Ukraine 
media ethics commission on 18 September noted the pro-government bias of 
reports on the protests. (UNIAN, 18 Sep 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) Moreover, Mykola Tomenko, chairman of the parliamentary 
freedom of speech committee, marked his concerns about "the obvious 
manifestations of state censorship." (UNIAN, 17 Sep 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) During the same week, though, the prosecutor-
general publicly admitted for the first time that the murder of Georgiy Gongadze 
was "politically motivated." In addition, Olena Prytula, the editor of Ukrainska 
Pravda, which used to be Gongadze's publication, was granted protection after 
she voiced concerns for her safety. 
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When the day came, Yushchenko did decide to take part in the "Rise Up, 
Ukraine!" protests and led a group of his supporters to Independence Square in 
Kyiv, where he joined the other three opposition leaders. The four signed a very 
strongly worded declaration demanding the immediate abdication of the 
president and early elections. (For its complete text, see www.ukrpravda.com) 
The opposition proceeded to construct a tent city near the presidential 
administration with the aim of presenting its declaration to President Kuchma 
when he returned from Salzburg. The reaction of the authorities was foreseeable: 
The tent city was raided during the early hours of 17 September and 64 persons 
were detained -- some were held on charges concerning weapons allegedly 
found in one of the tents. They have since been released upon the insistence of 
the prosecutor-general.  
 
Back in Kyiv, on 18 September Kuchma refused to meet with the protesters. 
Yushchenko denounced the raids: "No government can act like this if it really 
seeks a compromise with its own people," he said. Nevertheless, he softened his 
stance once more, stating that he had no plans to take part in the follow-up 
opposition rally Yulya Tymoshenko called for on 24 September.  
 
On 23 September, the three opposition leaders seized the Ukraine TV news 
studio, demanding 10 minutes of airtime in order to "refute all the lies spread 
about the events of 16 September," according to Yulya Tymoshenko. 
(UKRAINSKA PRAVDA website, 23 Sep 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) After negotiations with the president of the Ukrainian National 
Television Company, Igor Storozhuk, the protesters left the studio with a promise 
for airtime the next day, having caused that evening's news bulletin to be 
cancelled due to the occupation. 
 
With rallies continuing and growing across the country over the weekend, on 
Tuesday, 24 September, the opposition moved from its previous seizure of the 
TV station to the presidential office building. By the afternoon, supporters 
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announced a hunger strike to be continued until President Kuchma was willing to 
talk with them and accept the resolution. Kuchma agreed to meet on 25 
September with the leaders of the three opposition factions -- Tymoshenko, Petro 
Symonenko and Oleksandr Moroz -- but not the MPs who are in the presidential 
building with them and also on hunger strike. (ITAR-TASS, 25 Sep 02; via nexis-
lexis) Riot police arrived late on Tuesday night to ensure that those deputies left 
the building. (UNIAN, 24 Sep 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) Yushchenko withdrew his support from the resolution demanding 
Kuchma's resignation in the morning hours, but affirmed that he and his Our 
Ukraine faction favored the presidential impeachment in parliament. To start 
impeachment proceedings, 226 votes are needed in favor; however, two-thirds of 
the seats (301) are needed to actually effect an impeachment (AGENCE 
FRANCE-PRESSE,24 Sep 02; via nexis-lexis). This gives considerable weight to 
Yushchenko's decision, but not enough since the nine pro-presidential parties are 
united in their condemnation of the opposition's moves. (INTER TV, 24 Sep 02; 
BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Moreover, Kuchma 
declared he would not resign, following his meeting on 25 September with the 
opposition, so he political opponents are at an impasse. 
 
Yushchenko's acts of commission and omission have seriously weakened the 
opposition to Kuchma. While he did speak out against the president during the 
opposition forum, his strongest statements were carefully worded to imply that 
the system (not the president) was at fault - and was "inefficient, nontransparent, 
unstable and gravitates toward dictatorship." By providing another option to 
Kuchma with his plans to form a coalition, Yushchenko may be strengthening 
Kuchma's position. Now the president can pose as being "ready for dialogue," 
while simultaneously ignoring the opposition's attempts to establish such 
dialogue.  
 
Indecision on the part of the most important figure in the Ukrainian opposition is 
not new. However, recent events indicate that Kuchma is less in control of the 
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situation than he would have liked to be, with 50,000 protesters in Kyiv despite 
his ban and four parties of his supporters defecting to form a potential 
parliamentary majority with Yushchenko's Our Ukraine. It remains to be seen 
what the outcome will be and whether the crisis that began two years ago with 
the disappearance of Gongadze may finally reach its culmination. While 
Yushchenko's plan of a transformation initiated from within the parliament may 
make sense in terms of longer-term planning, it also runs the danger of 
hampering essential immediate change, and thus weakening the chances of his 
own plan's eventual fruition.  
 
Moreover, the Ukrainian situation internationally is no calmer than the domestic 
scene. Following allegations of Ukrainian arms sales to Iraq, the US froze aid to 
Ukraine, spurring a financial counterpart to the political crisis. Yushchenko is 
attempting to have a calming influence, stating that "no emotions, but common 
sense should rule." (UNIAN, 24 Sep 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) How much calm, however, will a lone voice in the storm be 
able to yield?  
 
BELARUS 
Speedy 'justice': journalist tried and sentenced in less than a week 
The week of the anniversary of Alyaksandr Lukashenka's second term in office 
also was the week of another anniversary. Viktor Ivaneshkevich, editor of the 
newspaper Rabochy, was charged with libel against the Belarusian leader a year 
ago, after publishing an article titled "A Thief's Place is in Prison" in the run-up to 
the 2001 presidential elections. The article reported corruption among the 
president's circle. The hearing against Ivaneshkevich resumed on 11 September, 
although the judge immediately closed the proceedings to the public and the 
media. 
 
On 16 September, the verdict was announced: two years "limited custody" plus 
forced labor for "attempted libel and insulting the chief of state" (INTERFAX, 16 
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Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0916, via World News Connection) -- one year less 
than the prosecution had demanded, and three years short of the maximum 
possible sentence. The verdict follows two recent similar sentences on Nikolai 
Markevich and Pavel Mozheiko of the newspaper Pagyona.  
 
The Belarusian Association of Journalists (BAJ) is campaigning for the abolition 
of articles 367, 368 and 369 of the penal code, which allow for such sentences 
and threaten freedom of the press. The BAJ has the support of Reporters 
Without Borders (RSF). After the verdict, RSF Secretary-General Robert Ménard 
reiterated his organization's demand for the abolition of those articles and for a 
stronger stance by the Council of Europe on the condition of the press in Belarus. 
The verdict, Ménard said, "smacks of what we thought was a bygone era, when 
anyone who made the slightest criticism of the authorities ended up in the 
Gulag." (REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, www.rsf.org) 
 
MOLDOVA 
Speaking in tongues 
Sometimes it seems that events failing to happen are more interesting that those 
that do occur. While Moldova was busy with the visit of two OSCE rapporteurs, 
with discussions on meeting Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
(PACE) requirements, and with a new round of secret talks concerning relations 
with Transdniestr, Moldovan Justice Minister Ion Morei made a startling 
statement -- all the more so because of the reaction it failed to arouse. 
"Romanian and Moldovan are not two different languages," he said in a recent 
newspaper interview. (MOLDOVA SUVERNA, 10 Sep 02; via Transitions Online) 
 
Not only the statement itself, but the speaker -- an official of a government that 
has steadily taken a pro-Moscow line and repeatedly asserted the difference 
between Romania's and Moldova's language and history -- seems to represent a 
surprising turnaround, especially given recent events. The prime minister and the 
president of Moldova ignored "Language Day" at the beginning of the month 
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despite the status the celebration has as a national holiday. There is increasing 
controversy over Russian Broadcasting Services being favored over Romanian-
language options. Moreover, the beginning of the school year on 2 September 
came amid controversy over compulsory Russian-language lessons and new 
history books.  
 
Yet Ion Morei's statements, including a call to change the wording of official 
documents from references to the term "Moldovan language" to "Romanian 
language," have come and gone seemingly without reaction. It seems unlikely 
that this was a mere personal opinion expressed without reflection during an 
interview. The question that remains is what -- if anything -- is to follow this 
statement: Was this supposed to test the waters, or is it, as Iurie Rosca of the 
opposition Popular Christian Democratic Party suggested, a sign of a 
forthcoming split within the Moldovan Communist Party? 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
GEORGIA 
What do the Russians want from Georgia? 
By mounting ever-greater pressure on Georgia, Russian politicians seem to be 
pursuing two goals -- to remove Georgia's President Eduard Shevardnadze and 
to deflect attention from Russia's failures in the Chechen war. Tasked by Putin to 
develop strategies for a strike against the Pankisi Gorge, the General Staff is 
airing scenarios for an outright occupation of all of Georgia.  
 
Georgia has met Russia's less unreasonable demands to impose control over the 
Pankisi Gorge by stationing MVD and military checkpoints throughout the area. 
Since the start of the operation earlier this month, Georgian power structures 
have arrested an Arab mercenary and a dozen other suspected criminals. 
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Georgia has invited international (including Russian) monitors to inspect any part 
of Georgian territory where purported Chechen fighters or al-Qaeda terrorists are 
alleged to be based. (ASSOCIATED PRESS, 18 Sep 02) Hence, Russia's 
security goals have been met, but its political ambitions remain insatiable. 
 
The weekly Kommersant Vlast comments that "Moscow has let it be known that 
while Shevardnadze is in power in Tbilisi, relations with Russia cannot improve.... 
Politicians who are close to him [Putin] express publicly what the head of state 
cannot say himself." Vlast cites an interview with Dmitri Rogozin, the president's 
special representative for the Kaliningrad region and chairman of the Duma's 
foreign relations committee, in which Rogozin "clearly stated that Russia can help 
Georgia rid itself of Shevardnadze if Georgia wishes this." (KOMMERSANT-
VLAST, 16-22 Sep 02, carried several analytical articles about the crisis and an 
interview with Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov. The newspaper cited Rogozin's 
interview with a Spanish newspaper not further identified.)  
 
However, two months into the current standoff, Russia still has not found a 
remotely palatable Georgian client. As candidates for possible pro-Russian 
puppets, Kommersant Vlast names Igor Giorgadze, the KGB chief who fled to 
Russia following his failed coup attempt in 1995 (see the previous issue of THE 
NIS OBSERVED); Dzhumber Patiashshvili, the Communist Party boss who 
presided over the massacre of peaceful demonstrators in Tbilisi on 9 April 1989 
(the event which sparked Georgia's drive for independence); Vazha 
Lordkipanidze, a notoriously corrupt former prime minister and political has-been; 
and Aslan Abashidze, the president of the Adjar Autonomous Republic who 
asserts his independence against Tbilisi mainly with the help of the Russian base 
on Adjar territory.  
 
The daily diet of hawkish warnings, demands and ultimata from Russia's 
president, defense minister and foreign policy establishment has united the 
mainstream Georgian political elite against Russia. According to Vlast, all the 
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popular candidates who may replace Shevardnadze when his term runs out in 
two years -- Avtandil Dzhorbenadze, the prime minister; Zurab Zhvania, the 
former prime minister; and Mikhail Saakashvili, the former justice minister -- are 
solidly pro-Western.  
 
Hence it seems increasingly unlikely that Russian pressure will produce a coup 
d'etat in Georgia. But the threats have not subsided. They include Putin's 11 
September ultimatum that threatened unilateral intervention in Georgia. In a 
highly emotional press conference on 17 September, a seemingly angry Putin 
reiterated the threat, claiming that "Georgian authorities ... are cooperating with 
terrorists." (ORT, 17 Sep 02) Speaking to Vlast, the defense minister, Sergei 
Ivanov, reiterated the president's 11 September statement, that Russia does not 
need to obtain a UN Security Council resolution to hit suspected Chechen bases 
in Georgia unless Georgia takes "extraordinary steps to block or destroy 
terrorists." In fact, Georgia took such measures even before the minister gave the 
interview.  
 
Russia's other goal in Georgia is to deflect attention from Moscow's political and 
military mistakes in Chechnya. The Russian Security Council is supposed to 
consider competing strategies for the Chechen campaign at its next session on 
24 September. The sound and fury over Pankisi Gorge may be part of the 
jockeying in the runup to this meeting.  
 
The war in Chechnya has entered its third year and victory remains remote. On 
21 September polit.ru reported that Chechens had seized two television stations 
(in Nadterechnyi rayon and in Sumashki) and transmitted broadcasts. This 
means that the fighters are active in the northern and flat part of Chechnya -- 
they were supposed to have been chased into the mountains. These attacks 
come on the heels of two helicopters downed -- one of them a stone's throw from 
the main Russian military base at Khankala. For the Russian military, the most 
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convenient excuse for these failures is to point the finger at Eduard 
Shevardnadze. 
 
In two conversations with former President Boris Yel'tsin in August and October 
1999, Shevardnadze refused to allow troops from Russian bases to traverse 
Georgia to open a second front against Chechnya from Georgian territory. Had 
Shevardnadze granted this request, his country would have been plunged into 
war. But now Russian generals point to the relative handful of fighters who 
entered Georgia's Pankisi Gorge with the Chechen civilian refugees in 1999 as 
the source of all evil. By the highest official estimates there are some 500 fighters 
among a population of 4,000 to 5,000 refugees. (Pavel Felgenhauer, a highly 
regarded independent analyst, estimates that there are some 40-50 hard-core 
"jihadists." See MOSCOW TIMES, 20 Sep 02.) If one were to believe Putin and 
his generals, these few Chechens are responsible for everything from sponsoring 
the Chechen resistance to the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and to 
the explosions in Russian cities in 1999.  
 
Felgenhauer argues that the Russian military can't mount an operation in Pankisi 
for technical reasons. The best troops are tied up in Chechnya; the terrain is 
nearly impassable at any time of year and soon will be covered in snow; landing 
troops by helicopter is risky and impractical; and bombing from a high altitude is 
unlikely to hit the fighters. (MOSCOW TIMES, 20 Sep 02) 
 
For these reasons, the General Staff is considering activating Russian bases in 
Georgia. Nezavisimaya voennoye obozreniye outlined on 20 September several 
schemes for an attack on Pankisi which were presented to Putin by the General 
Staff. The plans presume that, beside Chechen militants, Russian forces "will 
confront Georgian power structures." They envisage "squeezing fighters out of 
southern Chechnya into Pankisi," subsequent high-altitude bombardment, and 
the deployment of additional Russian forces to Russian bases in Georgia to 
bolster the 15,000 soldiers already deployed there. "Then having smashed the 
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bandit groups and their bases in Pankisi Gorge, they [Russian forces] may enter 
the rest of Georgia 'on the tails of the retreating enemy' and from there dictate 
the terms of the continued existence of this Caucasian country as a subject of 
international law."  
 
The general staff, under its chairman Anatoly Kvashnin, was the leading 
proponent of total war against Chechnya in the fall of 1999. Now it looks as 
though the General Staff wants to initiate a further adventure in Georgia. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By David Montgomery 
 
Shifting Partnerships: Kyrgyzstan - Russia and Kazakhstan - Uzbekistan 
As the Central Asian republics were creating their post-Soviet identities, the post-
11 September presence of allied forces and consequent shift of priorities has 
brought about a political transformation and additional cooperative agreements. 
These include the developed partnerships of the Shanghai Cooperative 
Organization, wherein the regional powers have emphasized trade relations and 
cooperation in fighting potentially destabilizing forces, as well as the acceptance 
of Western forces in pursuit of the Afghanistan campaign. While Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan host the largest presence of US troops, with camps along the 
Afghan-Uzbek border and air strips in Kyrgyzstan, the intensity of these new 
relationships has deepened global awareness of Central Asia as a region and is 
leading to further development of interesting alliances. Of late, Kyrgyzstan and 
Russia have increased cooperation on all levels, while Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan have improved relations that are beginning to reflect signs of pan-
Turkism. 
 
Kyrgyzstan and Russia: common renewal 
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As US military actions against Afghanistan continue to be based in Central Asia 
and there are indications that the fight against terrorism may expand northward, 
Russia tries to strengthen its regional influence. For some time since 
independence, Russian influence on Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan has been 
minimal. Russia's role in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan has been more manifest 
(given the presence of six million ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan and Russian 
troops posted along the Afghan-Tajik border), while the past few weeks have 
shown a strengthening of Russian-Kyrgyz relations. 
 
With 400 French troops scheduled to leave Kyrgyzstan early in October and the 
long-term concern regarding the presence of Islamic radicals in the region 
persisting, Russia clearly intends to prevent growing US influence and to assert 
hegemony should a power vacuum be created upon the eventual withdrawal of 
allied forces. (INTERFAX, 1105 GMT, 11 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0911, via 
World News Connection, and EURASIANET, 19 Sep 02; via 
www.eurasianet.org) Though officially there is Russian support for US and 
Western activities in the region, rumblings over their presence have started to 
surface. Commenting on this, Col. Gen. Leonid Ivashov, vice president of the 
Academy for Geopolitical Problems, stated that "Russia is being gradually 
pushed out of Central Asia, which has always been the area of our country's 
interests." (INTERFAX, 1147 GMT, 11 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0911, via World 
News Connection) And while Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev was quick to 
welcome Western interest in his country, he is seeking also to deepen relations 
with Russia. 
 
Economically, the extent of these deepened relations includes: a recent energy 
agreement, trade initiatives, agricultural assistance, and the increase of arms 
trade between the two countries. Russia is one of the largest foreign investors in 
Kyrgyzstan and negotiations between the two countries are aimed at creating 
symbiosis between the two economies. They have reached a preliminary 
agreement for Kyrgyzstan to export to Russia two billion-kilowatt hours of 
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electricity annually. This is the first time Kyrgyzstan will have exported energy to 
Russia and the negotiations have dealt with joint construction and operation of 
hydroelectric plants in Kyrgyzstan, as well as the delivery of Russian agricultural 
equipment (combines and tractors), and the delivery of Kyrgyz cotton and 
tobacco to Russia. (INTERFAX, 1445 GMT, 13 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0913, 
via World News Connection) 
 
Over the last six months, trade between Kyrgyzstan and Russia has increased 
30 percent. (ITAR-TASS, 1635 GMT, 11 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0911, via 
World News Connection) In addition to developments in the energy and 
agriculture sectors, cooperation is expanding in law enforcement and 
development of weapons. The Russian Federal Security Service has assisted the 
Kyrgyz secret service in investigating the 6 September grenade attack on Misir 
Ashirkulov, secretary of the Kyrgyz Security Council, and over the past two 
weeks comments from Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Askar Aitmatov, as well as 
Kyrgyz Defense Minister Esen Topoev, have attested to the priority of military 
connections with Russia. (ITAR-TASS, 1359 GMT, 13 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-
0913, ITAR-TASS, 0954 GMT, 9 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0909, and INTERFAX, 
1118 GMT, 10 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0910, via World News Connection) In a 
meeting with Akaev, Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized military 
cooperation between the two countries, commenting that "naval-technical 
cooperation has picked up" and encouraging an increase in arms trade between 
the two countries. (ITAR-TASS, 1314 GMT, 9 Sep 02, and INTERFAX, 1238 
GMT, 9 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0909, via World News Connection) (Although 
Kyrgyzstan is land-locked, it produced naval hardware during the Soviet period 
and it was at Lake Issyk-Kul that the Soviet Navy did the bulk of its submarine 
and torpedo testing.) 
 
Politically, Kyrgyzstan has been careful to demonstrate the priority accorded to 
relations with Moscow. Thus, Akaev met with Putin (9 September) prior to 
meeting with US President Bush (23 September). Speaking from Sochi, Russia, 
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Akaev emphasized the symbolic timing of the two meetings: "It's very important 
to receive advice from Russia as [our] main strategic ally and partner." 
(INTERFAX, 1538 GMT, 9 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0909, via World News 
Connection) 
 
Historically, Kyrgyzstan received more from the Soviet Union than it contributed, 
since it is relatively poor with undeveloped natural resources that are difficult to 
access. Recent rumblings of public discontent, including large protest 
demonstrations, have threatened domestic stability. Moscow's interests include 
keeping radical Islamists at arm's length from Russia's borders. Thus, Putin is 
planning to visit Kyrgyzstan again sometime before the end of the year. (ITAR-
TASS, 1624 GMT, 9 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0909, via World News Connection) 
 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan: a greater Turkestan 
Uzbekistan has been in the forefront of countries seeking distance from Russia. 
In part, the change of the Uzbek alphabet from Cyrillic to Latin letters 
emphasized Uzbekistan's non-Russian identity. Over the past year, Uzbekistan 
has made significant advances in its warm cooperative relations with the US. 
Just last week, President Bush praised Uzbek President Islam Karimov and 
expressed his satisfaction with the development of bilateral cooperation between 
the two countries. (INTERFAX, 0750 GMT, 19 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0919, via 
World News Connection) 
 
Significantly, Kazakhstan, with a sizeable ethnic Russian population in the 
northern part of the country, has taken meaningful steps toward improving 
relations with Uzbekistan. On 9 September 2002, Presidents Nursultan 
Nazarbaev and Karimov formalized the delimitation of the Kazakh-Uzbek border -
- which had constituted a point of friction, occasionally interrupting the flow of 
goods and people between the two countries -- and agreed on implementing the 
31 October 1998 Eternal Friendship Treaty between the two countries. 
(INTERFAX, 0900 GMT, 9 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0909, via World News 
 32 
Connection) What is more, Nazarbaev implied pan-Turkic sentiments by 
suggesting an eventual unification of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. (ITAR-TASS, 
1145 GMT, 9 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0909, via World News Connection) While 
linguistic and cultural ties would more clearly favor unification between 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan than with Uzbekistan (in more remote regions of the 
former Soviet Union, individuals often refer to the Kyrgyz as Kazakhs), any move 
toward the creation of a Turkestan (significantly through the unification of Central 
Asia's two strongest military powers) would indicate a shift away from Russian 
hegemony. Thus, the developing of Kyrgyz-Russian relations, as opposed to 
Kazakh-Uzbek relations, may indicate a potential geopolitical crevice in Central 
Asia. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Michael Varuolo 
 
Latvia and Lithuania return fire 
As the Prague summit for NATO enlargement approaches, Russia is assuming a 
more aggressive posture towards the Baltic states. Despite the seeming 
Russian-NATO rapprochement -- which led to new cooperation agreements -- 
Russia continues to object to Baltic entry into the alliance. In an attempt to 
hamper the chances of a NATO invitation to the Baltic states, Moscow has 
attempted to exploit the Kaliningrad transit issue as a Russian "grievance."  
 
Specifically, Russia continues to make demands of Lithuania concerning free-
transit rights for the Russian citizens to the Kaliningrad Oblast', to accuse Latvia 
of building a NATO radar site aimed at signals intelligence collection in Russia, 
and to assert that all three Baltic states are preparing for the deployment of 
NATO nuclear weapons within their territories. Of all these and numerous other 
accusations and complaints, only the Kaliningrad issue has gathered any 
international support. Russia has been successful in avoiding negotiations of the 
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issue with the party concerned -- the Lithuanian government -- and instead has 
persuaded the EU that the issue is between Russia and the EU, not Russia and 
Lithuania.  
 
Negotiations on the issue of Kaliningrad transit are scheduled to commence 
again on 30 September in Brussels. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 17 Sep 02; 
FBIS-SOV-2002-0918, via World News Connection) According to Dmitry 
Rogozin, Russia's ambassador for Kaliningrad issues, Moscow is optimistic 
about the chances for a positive solution to the transit problem. He claims that 
the EU is receptive to the new Russian proposal on Kaliningrad because Moscow 
has abandoned its demand for a special transit corridor. Instead, Rogozin 
claimed, Russia had proposed a new "transparent international transit" system of 
trains and buses which could be subject to police control. (PAP, 17 Sep 02; 
FBIS-SOV-2002-0917, via World News Connection) Should this "compromise" 
solution be accepted at the upcoming Brussels meeting, Russia would have been 
able to marginalize Lithuanian input into the negotiations and to impose Russia 
political objectives upon Lithuania. 
 
However, the Baltic states have not resigned themselves to passive acceptance 
of Russian interference. On the contrary, rather than assuming a subservient 
position, they have formed a front with one another as well as with other 
governments that support the Baltic states in their efforts to re-integrate 
themselves into Europe. 
 
Following repeated unfounded assertions by Russian officials, Latvia and 
Lithuania launched a united campaign to rebut claims concerning the putative 
deployment of nuclear weapons on Baltic territory. Latvian Minister of Defense 
Girts Valdis Kristovskis began the process by stating that the deployment of 
nuclear weapons was not under discussion. "If Russia had only once discussed 
this issue with Latvia's Defense Ministry or Defense Minister, it would not have 
had to spread this information," he said. (BNS, 1206 GMT, 16 Sep 02; FBIS-
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SOV-2002-0916, via World News Connection) Kristovskis was supported later in 
the day by Prime Minister Andris Berzins, who questioned the motives behind the 
Russian assertions. "It is provocation, an intentional wish to influence the pre-
election situation [in Latvia], to create fear and panic among the people," he said. 
(BNS, 1510 GMT, 16 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0916, via World News 
Connection) Almost simultaneously, Linas Linkevicius, the Lithuanian defense 
minister, refuted the Russian accusations. He hinted at a long-held Baltic belief, 
stating "We might have similar fears about Russia's nuclear weapons deployed in 
the Kaliningrad region." (BNS, 1657 GMT, 16 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0916, via 
World News Connection) 
 
Kristovskis' comments marked the second time in six days that the Latvian 
defense minister had publicly dismissed Russian claims and accused Moscow of 
trying to meddle in Latvia's affairs. On 11 September, Kristovskis addressed 
Russian concerns about a radar station, which is planned for construction in the 
eastern part of Latvia. He called the allegations concerning the radar's signals 
collection abilities "absurd" and "groundless." (BNS, 1559 GMT, 11 Sep 02; 
FBIS-SOV-2002-0911, via World News Connection) 
 
Support for Latvia's and Lithuania's willingness to take a strong stand in refuting 
Russian claims also has been apparent. Denmark's defense minister, Svend 
Aage Jensby, met with Latvian representatives and reaffirmed his country's 
commitment to support Latvia on a variety of defense-related issues. (LETA, 
1022 GMT, 18 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0918, via World News Connection) 
Lithuania, meanwhile, was supported by Poland, which established a permanent 
Lithuanian liaison office within the NATO Unit Headquarters located in Szczecin. 
(PAP, 1520 GMT, 18 Sep 02; FBIS-EEU-2002-0918, via World News 
Connection) Additionally, Poland agreed to aid Lithuania in its attempt to 
integrate its Baltic air-observation capabilities with NATO assets. (BNS, 1425 
GMT, 9 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0909, via World News Connection)  
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The Baltic states also received a significant political boost from Brussels, when 
an anonymous source from NATO headquarters informed the press that at least 
four countries have been given the green light for the next round of enlargement, 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania comprising three of those states. (AGENCE-
FRANCE PRESSE, 1509 GMT, 18 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0918, via World 
News Connection) This report was welcome news for all three Baltic capitals, 
indicating a fresh vote of confidence from an international community that may be 
finding its political voice once again. 
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